Black Hat Asia 2026 | IntentGuard: Securing LLM-Generated Cloud Configurations

GenAI assistants increasingly generate and modify configuration files—Kubernetes manifests, Terraform configurations, AWS CloudFormation templates, Helm charts, and others. These artifacts are security-critical, yet modern scanners and linters evaluate only correctness against predefined rules, not the operational intent the configuration is supposed to enforce. This creates a new attack surface: adversaries can poison configuration templates (via model jailbreaking or prompt injection), so that natural-language cues silently steer LLMs toward producing insecure configurations that still appear functionally correct. These "semantic misalignments" evade IaC scanning and pass human review because the generated configuration looks plausible but no longer matches the intended project purpose and security posture. This talk introduces IntentGuard, a novel Intent-Aligned Semantic Validation defensive framework that infers the intended behavior of a project, including configuration templates and marks configurations that contradict that intent. By reconstructing the service's intended role in the project—capturing its business, operational and performace roles, permitted communication graphs, dataflow and dependencies, privilege boundaries, —the framework identifies when configurations violate those structural and semantic intentions, enabling detection of latent misconfigurations such as conditional privilege escalation, unauthorized resource access, RBAC drift, information leakage, and infrastructure-level backdoors. Rather than relying on brittle prompt hardening or traditional scanners, intent-aligned validation detects when an LLM's output ceases to represent what the configuration was meant to enforce—even if the configuration is syntactically valid and operationally sound. Anna Bacher | CTO-Co-Founder, Jaroona GmbH Chris Wysopal | Co-Founder & Chief Security Evangelist, Veracode, Inc. https://ift.tt/GB2ASOY

source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kd2eqp8ZUpA

Black Hat Asia 2026 | Faster Detection and Counteraction of N-Day Exploits in Chromium-based Apps

N-day exploitation speed is accelerating. For certain high-impact Chromium vulnerabilities, we observed exploitation attempts appearing shortly after public disclosure as fast as 24 hours, creating intense pressure on defenders. Yet many enterprise client applications built on Chromium face an asymmetric challenge: their release cadence and user-upgrade reality often lag behind attackers. Deep customization of the Chromium engine, fragmented client versions, and user groups that cannot readily update mean that official patches may take significant time to reach all endpoints. During this window, even well-managed products remain exposed. This talk presents a complementary, in-app defense architecture designed to operate alongside traditional patching, especially for applications where upgrading the underlying Chromium engine is slow or operationally difficult. Which integrates: • Accelerated patch analysis and down-version migration, enabling rapid internal adaptation of Chromium fixes across heterogeneous client baselines. • How to build an AI-based behavior-driven, in-app runtime detection capable of identifying exploitation attempts for newly disclosed CVEs across multiple client versions. • Realtime, on-client counteraction mechanisms that can disrupt or neutralize exploitation attempts, providing protection before a patched release can reach to the entire user base. This approach shortens the exposure window by adding a runtime, version-agnostic defense layer that can immediately respond to emerging threats. We will demonstrate how enterprises can enhance Chromium-based products with a layered, resilient protection model to reduce the operational risks posed by fast-moving N-day exploitation. Wenxiang Qian | Security Engineer Zhixin Tu | Security Engineer https://ift.tt/ClH5Gqe

source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-xaIpNlecJM

Black Hat Asia 2026 | Tropic Trooper Reloaded: Unraveling the Invisible Supply Chain Mystery

Tropic Trooper (a.k.a. Pirate Panda, KeyBoy) has long been known for its rapid adoption of emerging techniques and its willingness to deploy them aggressively in real-world intrusions. The group has repeatedly demonstrated a readiness to test unconventional intrusion vectors, such as deploying fake Wi-Fi access points in targeted physical areas. In past campaigns, we have also observed the adoption of post-exploitation techniques, such as abusing VS Code Remote Tunnels, as well as loader families engineered to resist analysis, including heavily obfuscated Xiangoop loader variants. The Xiangoop loader is a distinctive malware family associated with this threat actor. Based on our 2025 investigation, several new malware families, toolsets, and notable artifacts, including decoys were identified, providing fresh insight into the group's expanding geographic footprint and targeted industries. Recent activity has revealed a marked shift toward OSS-based tools within the infection chain. These findings highlight a rapid change in the actor's tooling strategy, demonstrating its ability to pivot quickly and overhaul their methods within a short period of time. Earlier activity in 2024 included a supply-chain compromise in which malware was delivered through what appeared to be the legitimate update process of a widely used dictionary application. Although the exact infection path was unclear at the time, a follow-up investigation in 2025 indicated that unauthorized changes had been made to the target's home router, resulting in malware infections. This session will provide a detailed overview of Tropic Trooper's operations in 2025, including the evolution of its loader and RAT ecosystem, abuse of home routers, and intrusion workflows. These findings reinforce the need for flexible, assumption-free investigative approaches, as this actor continues to shift techniques at high velocity. Suguru Ishimaru | Executive Cybersecurity Researcher, ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence Inc. Satoshi Kamekawa | Cybersecurity Researcher, ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence Inc. https://ift.tt/Dn8uUFN

source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8kXXc1Lsry0

Black Hat Asia 2026 | Advanced Glitching Leveraging Hidden CPU–eMMC Behavior

Secure Boot is a core security mechanism in embedded and automotive-grade SoCs, ensuring the integrity of the boot chain by verifying firmware signatures. However, in practical attacks, although fault injection techniques (such as EMFI and voltage glitching) are highly destructive, their success rate is fundamentally limited by the inability to precisely locate the moment when signature verification is performed. As a result, attackers are forced to blindly inject faults over hundreds of milliseconds of the boot process, leading to high noise, low success rates, and a significant risk of irreversible CPU damage. This presentation proposes a new high-precision fault attack localization method. In environments where the CPU provides no serial output, we jointly analyze the micro-level electromagnetic emission characteristics of the CPU core and the low-level timing behavior of the eMMC and DDR buses. By constructing a cross-domain hardware signal correlation model, we accurately calibrate the actual time point at which Secure Boot executes its verification logic. Through multi-level sampling and signal correlation, we compress the fault attack window from the second scale down to the millisecond or even nanosecond scale, transforming traditional "blind glitching" into a repeatable and precisely targeted attack. We demonstrate the complete process of successfully bypassing Secure Boot on real embedded devices using this method and reveal the physical leakage paths that exist between the CPU and peripheral storage during runtime. This research has significant implications for hardware security evaluation and fault injection attack studies. Jie Fu | Head of SkyHunter, China Telecom Cyber Security Technology Co., Ltd. Qiang Qin | Security Researcher, China Telecom Cyber Security Technology Co., Ltd. Shaohua Zhang | Security Researcher, China Telecom Cyber Security Technology Co., Ltd. Chunmei Zhang | Researcher, China Telecom Yang Chen | Senior Binary Researcher, China Telecom Cyber Security Technology Co., Ltd. YuJie Lu | Security Researcher, China Telecom Cyber Security Technology Co., Ltd. WeiChao Zhou | Director of Waterdrop Laboratory, China Telecom Cyber Security Technology Co., Ltd. https://ift.tt/j8vuWfr

source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VBF5ID-3Ve4

Black Hat Asia 2026 | Lost in Normalization: From URL Quirks to Poisoning the Azure Supply Chain

We transformed a single, isolated container in Azure Container Instances (ACI) for GPU into a full tenant-isolation breach and a critical supply chain attack. This talk details the multi-stage exploit chain that broke a seemingly secure, multi-layered design. It all started with a misconfiguration that exposed a container image for a highly sensitive internal Kubernetes component, effectively handing us its source code. We will demonstrate how we chained two novel vulnerabilities, discovered in this internal code, with advanced Kubernetes techniques to achieve critical service compromise. First, we achieved full cross-tenant credential theft, allowing us to steal secrets from other tenants' private container registries. More critically, we escalated this access to gain write permissions to a shared, production container registry used by ACI itself. This would have potentially allowed an attacker to poison trusted, official ACI images, creating a platform-wide supply chain attack. Shortly after, following the disclosure of these critical vulnerabilities, the service was retired. This Briefing serves as a case study in how a single flaw can undermine a robust security design. Attendees will get a rare look into the internal security architecture of a major cloud service and learn to identify and defend against similar platform-wide vulnerabilities. Nir Ohfeld | Head of Vulnerability Research, Wiz Ronen Shustin | Security Researcher, Wiz https://ift.tt/cUuI8hz

source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CdOw22fA6Xo

Black Hat Asia 2026 | the Source, Of the Source

Sure, you can double‑check package names, stick to trusted maintainers, and install only from reputable sources. But even if you play everything perfectly, what happens when the infrastructure itself is what gets pwned? This research goes past the packages themselves and straight into the machinery underneath: exploiting the registry services, CDNs and proxie that every build quietly depends on. Once we treated those systems as the real attack surface, things got interesting fast. This talk walks through how we uncovered critical vulnerabilities across package distribution infrastructure of JavaScript, Julia, Go, .NET, Lua, and more — bugs that enabled account takeover, package hijacks, server-side RCE, and other ecosystem‑level compromises quietly embedded in the infrastructure. Even when developers do everything right, the systems delivering their code can still be the weak link. The problem isn't always just your dependencies; it's sometimes the systems that ship them. This is our journey into breaking (and ultimately helping secure) the foundations of modern software distribution. Tsi-Lin Ng | Security Researcher, DEVCORE https://ift.tt/Z5EBAl2

source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPpHyYv6SqU

Black Hat Asia 2026 | Cyber-Paleontology in the Age of AI

A sophisticated cyber-espionage toolkit can disappear for decades-and still outperform modern implants. In this Briefing, we will present the discovery and reconstruction of an undocumented nation-state framework believed to have gone extinct more than 20 years ago. Although buried in time, this "fossil" malware reveals engineering decisions that remain surprisingly competitive today, and it appears to have quietly influenced reconnaissance platforms that emerged long after it. But the story isn't only about the tool. Because this framework was never publicly documented, it creates a rare testbed for something security teams are increasingly relying on: AI-driven malware analysis and attribution. We use the case to measure how modern AI systems behave when they cannot rely on training data, prior writeups, or recognizable patterns-and compare their conclusions to careful, expert-led reverse engineering. The result is both a recovered chapter of cyber-espionage history and a grounded look at where AI helps, where it misleads, and what its failure modes look like in cyber-paleontology. Vitaly Kamluk | Founder, TitanHex+SentinelLABS https://ift.tt/ZzTCFgW

source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2F0mFtGqsl0

Black Hat Asia 2026 | Discovering React2Shell: JavaScript’s Long-Awaited Deserialization Flight-mare

Millions of exposed sites. Over a billion attack attempts in a week. When you hear "Insecure Deserialization", you usually think of legacy Java apps, PHP behemoths, or crusty .NET projects – not the most popular modern JavaScript framework. React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) challenged this, proving that "this code is widely used and battle-tested, so I'm sure it's secure" doesn't mean we can't teach this new dog some old deserialization tricks. This Briefing will cover the novel attack surface of deserializing complex JavaScript objects and building sophisticated exploits that abuse quirks of the language, V8 engine, and Node.js runtime. As well as detailing how I discovered React2Shell, I'll also share the impact of AI hallucinations, the double-edged sword of day-zero defenses, and lessons learned across the industry. Lachlan Davidson | Security Innovation Lead, Carapace https://ift.tt/ZUhyfKX

source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtYAuqS4fsg

Black Hat Asia 2026 | Post-Quantum Cryptography: A Realistic Guide to Manage the Transition

The quantum computing risk has become a boardroom issue, driven by the emergence of standards, government-issued guidelines, and companies attempting to build quantum computers. Despite lackluster progress, the risk must not be ignored, hence organizations must assess their exposure and ensure appropriate defenses, which mostly consist of post-quantum cryptography. This presentation offers a technical and strategic roadmap for PQC integration: We'll first characterize the risk, mostly via its impact for various systems such as VPNs, encryption-at-rest, and distributed ledgers. We'll discuss the various "harvest now, decrypt later" scenarios and why quantum computers won't steal your Bitcoin (but might affect blockchain systems in surprising ways.) Although the expected timeline is an elusive topic, I'll share my perspective. We'll then describe the technical options, reviewing the standards and recommendations in various regions—in the U.S. (NIST), as well as China (GM/T), Japan (CRYPTREC), and Korea (KISA). Drawing from my work as co-author of FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), I'll describe the different algorithm types and their respective properties in terms of security assurance and performance, also discussing hybrid deployment modes. Finally, we'll share our experience in managing the risk as a CSO: creating an internal migration plan, performing risk assessments, adapting cryptographic software, and addressing clients' and regulators' concerns. Jean-Philippe Aumasson | Cofounder and CSO, Taurus https://ift.tt/CoKMhUy

source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_M0of-6aLpk

Black Hat Asia 2026 | Network Operations Center (NOC) Report

Back with another year of soul-crushing statistics, the Black Hat NOC team will be sharing all of the data that keeps us equally puzzled, and entertained, year after year. We'll let you know all the tools and techniques we're using to set up, stabilize, and secure the network, and what changes we've made over the past year to try and keep doing things better. Of course, we'll be sharing some of the more humorous network activity and what it helps us learn about the way security professionals conduct themselves on an open WiFi network. Bart Stump | Managing Principal, Coalfire Neil R. (a.k.a. Grifter) Wyler | Vice President of Defensive Services, Coalfire https://ift.tt/NrkTzZp

source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=05w_6iUGFvE

Black Hat Asia 2026 | Hidden Telemetry: Uncovering TraceLogging ETW Providers You're Not Using (Yet)

Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) is a built-in Windows logging and tracing framework that collects system and application events, providing detailed visibility into what's happening on a machine. In security, ETW is widely leveraged as one of the key telemetry sources for modern Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) products because of the wealth of data it provides. This trace data is generated by components known as providers. While four types exist—Managed Object Format (MOF), Windows software trace preprocessor (WPP), Manifest-based, and TraceLogging—Microsoft generally recommends using the two modern variants: Manifest-based and TraceLogging providers [1]. However, a significant knowledge gap exists. While Manifest-based providers are relatively well-understood [2], information regarding TraceLogging providers remains scarce. Consequently, it is questionable whether the security community is truly maximizing ETW's full potential. To bridge this gap and enable defenders to better leverage ETW, we will present our findings on TraceLogging providers in the latest Windows. We will cover how to work with them, highlight providers potentially useful for security (e.g., AttackSurfaceMonitor), and walk through practical use cases. Asuka Nakajima | Senior Security Research Engineer, Elastic https://ift.tt/PNbRd1M

source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ubFcs1M62P4